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Abstract
Disappearing messages is an optional feature available in popular applications for more privacy. The
Telegram instant messenger application is a rival and alternative to the popular messaging application
WhatsApp, with both applications citing end-to-end encryption for both messages and calls as a key
offering. While Telegram doesn’t officially have a ‘disappearing message’ feature like WhatsApp it still
is possible to send disappearing messages using the secret chat functionality. In this paper, we analyse
and evaluate ‘disappearing messages’ across Telegram and Snapchat to see whether they can be
forensically preserved and/or recovered across Apple and Android operating systems. As these
messages could be vital to investigations, with potential evidence and intelligence stored on them, not
to mention the limited timeframe in which they are ‘viewable’ to the user, it is a great opportunity for
digital forensic analysts to understand how they are stored, managed, and ‘deleted’ compared to
traditional messages on the same platforms/applications.
Keywords: digital forensics, messages, privacy, security, telegram.

1. Introduction
Instant Messengers (IMs) are one of the most common ways of communicating in the modern world.
With 2 billion active users, WhatsApp is the number one IM application, followed by the Chinese
messaging app WeChat with 1.2 billion users and the Messenger app by Meta with close to 1 billion
users (Statistica, 2022). While their underlying features are very similar, users are attracted to different
applications for improved security and privacy. Applications that offer ‘secure messaging’ utilise endto-end encryption which means that other parties (e.g., your Internet service providers (ISP), the app
maker, the government) can’t see your data and your messages. Telegram (Das, 2022) is cited as being
one of the best messaging applications for secure encrypted messaging offering client-server encryption
for standard chats. In addition, messages cannot be forwarded on the Telegram app to anyone by the
recipient from secret chats.
Recently, Instagram and Facebook Messenger have introduced ‘secure messaging’ options on their
platforms, such as ‘Disappearing Photo/Video’ on Instagram (Instagram, 2022) and ‘disappearing
messages’ listed as ‘Secret Mode’ on Messenger (Facebook, 2022). Meta was not the first to offer such
measures to improve users’ privacy matters, as Snapchat had these features included by default since
its launch in 2011 (Wikipedia, 2022), and WhatsApp’s main rival Telegram was later released in 2013
(Telegram, 2022). However, despite these apparent privacy safeguards, just how private are these
‘secret/disappearing messages’ on these platforms, and are they truly secure? At present, the only
known ways of being able to preserve these ‘disappearing’ messages as evidence are as follows:
•

Screenshotting the messages using the device (which is not forensically sound/contains time
constraints)

•
•
•

Photographing the device in which the messages are displayed (which imposes time constraints
and yields no metadata)
Replying to a message (which is not forensically sound and imposes time constraints)
Extracting a backup from the Cloud (which is subject to legal issues surrounding cloud
forensics, and does not guarantee that the message will not expire upon extraction)

Currently, of all the above, photographing the device while it displays these messages is the most
effective means of providing evidence. However, we argue that even this method is subject to several
further issues such as:
•
•
•
•

The state of the device (damage, powered off)
Security measures (passwords, hidden/secure areas)
Network access (in network isolation, the device may not be able to retrieve messages from
servers i.e., Snapchat)
Outdated applications (some apps require verification by synchronizing to a server after being
disconnected i.e., WhatsApp).

Disappearing messages present an increase in risk to all cases involving modern technology and set a
hard timeframe for the investigators to adhere to, with many cases to balance and high-risk cases taking
priority. With other risks involved in the mobile forensic process, such as password/PIN protection,
encryption, and data sizes, any hindrance to the investigation, such as the mobile device requiring a
PIN/password (with the suspect being non-compliant), alongside other issues (e.g., compatibility
problems and/or extraction length) result in no time remaining for analysis and potentially
unrecoverable messages.
Our study aims to find the most forensically sound and effective manner for capturing the data, and
being able to present it as credible evidence. We explore Telegram and Snapchat, as Telegram is a
popular alternative to WhatsApp, and Snapchat has disappearing messages by default. These two
applications will also be used to compare the separate ways in which messages can ‘disappear’,
answering the following research questions: Can these messages be forensically recovered and/or
secured? Are these messages truly secret? Our results and analysis will provide reliable and repeatable
means to recover these messages for digital forensics investigators; specifically, whether they can be
recovered and preserved, and whether they pose a challenge to criminal investigations for digital
forensic investigators in the field.

2. Related Works
While there are related works exploring the forensic analysis of Snapchat and Telegram the works are
dated and not within our scope of the investigation - analysing the features of the disappearing message.
Alyaha and Kausar (2017) focus on the analysis of Snapchat and its artefacts via an Android
smartphone. Their methodology is simplistic, by following the process of population > acquisition >
examine > report. While they do state how many data artefacts they have created on the device, they do
not provide any details for these artefacts beyond a categorisation such as “photo”, “video”, and
“message”. They locate the cache directory, main databases, and Snapchat folder which provides
limited artefacts back; namely the messages and received images. From their findings, they recovered
little in deleted artefacts, retrieving only one deleted story photo. However, they did recover the chat
database which contained some messages (26 of the 36 sent – 11 of which were duplicates). The
duplicate files were due to files having existed in multiple directories. They concluded that deleted
snaps were not recoverable. As we are focusing on the disappearing side of these messages, it would

have been useful to have provided a better insight as to why these messages were not presented, and
whether any changes in the methodology would have changed this outcome.
Anglano et al. (2017) focuses on the forensic analysis of the Telegram messenger application on an
Android smartphone. Their contributions are twofold; the creation of a methodology for the forensic
analysis of Android-based IM Applications, and a thorough analysis of the Telegram messenger’s
artefacts (their structure, formatting, message data, etc). Their methodology revolves around a series of
experiments, where user actions are performed and how this changes the extractable artefacts and
investigations results are analysed. The experiments are varied and cover all aspects of the application's
features, but the main contribution of the work is the analysis of secret chats (Anglano et al., 2017).
From their findings, Telegram stores ‘secret chat’ messages in a separate table on the database, under
“enc_chats”. From here, they were able to discern distinct characteristics regarding these chats, such
as: ‘Chat ID (uid)’, ‘TDS Encrypted Chat (data)’, ‘Username of the owner (user)’ and ‘Name of the
secret chat (name)’. From here, they were then able to dissect the TDS Encrypted down into a structure
containing the following: ‘ID of the chat (id)’, ‘TID of the secret chat partner (admin_ID)’, ‘Creation
date/time of the secret chat (date)’ and ‘TID of users who join the chat (participant_ID)’.
Azhar & Barton (2016) conducted a forensic analysis of Wickr and Telegram in an attempt to recover
artefacts removed by the ephemeral (disappearing) functions. Results from their experiment showed
that disappearing messages set using the self-destruct timer were not successfully recovered from the
digital forensic remnant for both apps. However, they were able to recover expired image files
associated with the Telegram application from the cache directory on the Android device’s physical
image. Son et al. (2020) conducted a forensic analysis of instant messengers that also have disappearing
messaging features including Signal, Wickr and Threema. The focus of their study was on the successful
decryption and relevant forensic artefacts that could be recovered from the encrypted SQLCipher
databases used by these instant messaging applications. Similarly, studies by Kim et al. (2020) and Kim
et al. (2021), also focused on forensic analysis of ephemeral instant messengers, Telegram X, BBMEnterprise and Wickr respectively, although the focus of both investigations were limited to the
decryption of encrypted databases and not the recovery of disappearing messages. To the best of our
knowledge, there has been no recent study that has focused on the successful recovery of disappearing
messages for Telegram and Snapchat messaging apps on both iOS and Android devices. Therefore, by
focusing on the recovery of disappearing messages, we can make the most of the potential investigative
impact of our work.

3. Methodology and Experiments
Given that the goal of any forensic analysis is to allow the analyst to obtain the digital evidence
generated by the applications under consideration, the methodology we adopted allowed completeness,
repeatability, and generality (Anglano et al., 2017, Akinbi & Ojie, 2021). As the ‘disappearing
messages’ trend is particularly new there are (at the time of writing) no viable reports to review and
compare against our own set of results. We will use a Samsung S6 (Android 7 OS) and an Apple device
(iOS 12.1). The results of the devices will be compared to provide an insight into how both operating
systems handle the data differently. We created an investigative scenario followed by subsequent
phases, “Installation of application” and “Design of experiments” respectively for each application. We
installed and ran Telegram v 8.5.1 and Snapchat v 11.64.0.36.
In the “Design of experiments” phase, we define a set of experiments that involve using the applications,
creating photos and videos using the camera, sending and downloading messages.

To ensure we knew what data should be present on the device we created a table of sample data, as well
as interactions made with the device during the population period. This is useful as we can audit and
log what data was seeded, to ensure that the data extracted could be cross-examined and checked for
accuracy. Table 1 shows the types of media messages supported by the apps. Four images and four
videos have been created, two of each on both devices. Audio and files have been excluded from the
media used on the premise that we believe they will act in the same way as images and videos. Locations
and contacts have been excluded from the media available, due to limitations in GDPR regarding
personal information. The extraction of data from the mobile applications was completed using the
tools: UFED’ 4PC, and MSAB’s XRY.

Application
Telegram
Snapchat

Texts/Chats
✓
✓

Images
✓
✓

Video
✓
✓

Audio/Voice
✓
✓

Files
✓
x

Location
✓
✓

Contacts
✓
✓

Table 1: Types of media supported by Telegram and Snapchat

We split the experiments into two test groups: Snapchat Messages and Telegram Secret Chat.
‘Snapchat Messages’ will be a comparison and test to see whether Snapchat messages can be recovered
via forensic means by performing a standard mobile extraction on the device with both ‘unsaved’ and
‘saved’ messages on Snapchat. It will also determine what data can be brought back from the application
from extractions, and how Snapchat deals with disappearing messages. ‘Telegram Secret Chat’ will be
a comparison and test to see whether Telegram’s ‘Secret mode’ messages can be recovered via forensic
means by performing a standard mobile extraction on the device. It will also determine what data can
be brought back from the application from extractions, and how Telegram deals with disappearing
messages.
3.1 Snapchat Messages
Using the Snapchat application, we compared “disappearing by default” and “decisive disappearing”
where Snapchat automatically deletes messages unless they are specifically saved by the user via
tapping on them. The iPhone extraction was not able to extract any Snapchat data other than the
application files, as seen below under the “toyopagroup.picaboo” (Figure 1) application name.

Figure 1: iPhone File System Snapchat

The Samsung phone managed to recover most of the chat data regardless of whether the messages were
saved or unsaved (minus 1 timed photo, and 2 videos) as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Samsung Snapchat Chats

By creating an Autopsy case and placing the extracted .com files out of the UFED extraction, a database
known as “arroyo.db” (found in /com.snapchat.android/databases) contained the data for the
conversation shown above. Further work would have to be conducted to translate the BLOB data into
messages using a hex viewer and decoder, images, or videos to see whether the missing data could still
be recovered.

Figure 3: Autopsy "Arroyo.db"

3.2 Telegram Chats
We created two Telegram chats: a “regular chat” and a “secret messages” chat which enables
disappearing messages. Neither of these Telegram chats were extracted in either pre or post-expiry
extraction on the iPhone. The only data retrieved was the application data as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: iPhone Telegram File System and plist details

When opened, the “preferences.plist” contained no data regarding disappearing messages. In both
Samsung extractions, the regular chat was extracted without issue, showing both messages – Figures 5
and 6. Limited data were extracted from the secret chats in both extractions but the metadata was
incorrect, showing “15/05/2015”.

Figure 5: Telegram Samsung regular chats

Figure 6: Telegram Samsung Secret Chats

The wrong metadata was surprising, so we investigated further to see where the data had been extracted
from (as shown in Figure 7). As identified, we opened “Cache4.db” located within the Telegram “files”
folder.

Figure 7: Storage Location Telegram Chats Samsung

As shown in Figure 8, the data has not been parsed correctly and there are fragments of data contained
within the “data” column of the table “messages_v2”. By converting the time into “Seconds from UTC

1970” the correct metadata times are now shown – see Figures 9 and 10. Using the in-built hex editor,
the hex data shows some of the message contents that were sent.

Figure 8: "Cache4.db" messages_v2 table

Figure 9: Date conversion

Figure 10: Cache4.db hex editor
Another piece of evidence found was the file path of the images that had been sent through the “secret
chat” (Figure 11) within the hex.

Figure 11: File paths from hex

Using this, and the Cellebrite search tool, “221117_102137.jpg” returned a result on both the pre and
post-extractions, showing the original image as shown in Figure 12. It is clear that Cellebrite has not
accurately parsed the data and further follow-up testing should be conducted to see whether this is a
recurring issue. However, manual data can be extracted using the above techniques to retrieve
incorrectly parsed artefacts. Not all artefacts may be available, as deleted messages and video messages
were not recovered.

Figure 12: File path photo

4. Analysis and Significance of Findings
Within this section, we analyse and present the significance of our findings. We highlight the main
findings from our Snapchat experiments, and Telegram experiments, and then compare Snapchat and
Telegram.
Snapchat: A series of messages were sent/received between the two devices. When examining the
iPhone, no data could be forensically recovered from the device, besides the installation of the
application on the device. These results highlight sanitization of data within Snapchat, which in turn,
poses an issue for forensic investigations. However, the same data when examined on the Samsung was
almost completely retrievable (aside from 3 artefacts); showing that Snapchat for Android has a poor
data sanitization procedure, alongside Telegram. Whether this is due to Samsung’s physical extraction
or down to the specific hardware/software of the device in a forensic investigation is unclear, however,
an Android device is likely to provide more data due to this. Overall, forensically analysing Snapchat
for iOS should be conducted manually first (if possible) before attempting to conduct a logical
extraction. For Android, a physical extraction (if possible) is the best available method for the extraction
of Snapchat artefacts.
Telegram: Telegram was used on both devices to send/receive a series of messages and media. On the
iPhone data was completely irretrievable, both pre and post-expiry; showing that Telegram for iOS has
a commendable sanitization procedure. However, on Samsung, the examination of the device, while
not as straightforward as the Snapchat examination did contain some artefacts from the experimental
data. This required a manual review of the Telegram application files and even browsing hex-data

contained within the BLOB entries. Telegram’s data sanitization for Android is inconsistent but is better
than Snapchat. Overall, a manual review of Telegram for iOS may be required before conducting any
extractions. This would ensure that data residing on the device is captured before attempting to retrieve
(and potentially lose) more data via an extraction. Regarding Android, a physical extraction is the best
available extraction and the examiner should ensure that they verify and review the associated database
files and data.
Snapchat vs Telegram: both Telegram and Snapchat share similar results. These are presented in more
detail within Tables 3-6 below. The iOS retains no artefacts on either application (besides the basic
installation files), whereas Samsung has a greater potential for the recovery of artefacts across both
extractions. From a forensic perspective, Snapchat provides the examiner with an ‘easier’ extraction,
without the need for manually reviewing database files, as well as the near complete recovery of
artefacts, making Snapchat an easier application to analyse. Each of the tables below contains the results
of each group testing, supplying an easy-to-read graphic of what data persists pre and post
“disappearing”.

Key
Y
N
/

Meaning
Data was fully retained and parsed
Data was missing/not extracted
Data was partially available/parsed

Table 2: Key explanation

Snapchat Extraction, Device: iPhone 6s
Tool Used: UFED 4PC
Extraction(s): Logical & Advanced Logical

Date/Time added

Sent/Received?

02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:23
02/02/2022 13:23
02/02/2022 13:25

Received
Received
Sent
Sent
Sent
Received
Sent
Received
Received
Sent

02/02/2022 13:26
02/02/2022 13:28
02/02/2022 13:28
02/02/2022 13:29
02/02/2022 13:90

Sent
Sent
Received
Received
Sent

Data description
“Hello”
“This is a test of the disappearing messages”
“I will save this message” – iPhone saved
“Hello”
“I will now save this message”
“iPhone save this message” – iPhone saved
“Samsung save this message” – Samsung saved
Photo of BIC pen – Saved by iPhone
Timed (10s) photo of screwdriver
Photo of evidence tape – Replayed & saved by
Samsung
Timed (10s) photo of duct tape
Photo of screwdriver
Photo of screwdriver
“This message will not be saved”
“Neither will this”

Table 3: Snapchat extraction of iPhone 6s

Cellebrite
Recoverable?
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Snapchat Extraction, Device: Samsung S6
Tool Used: UFED 4PC
Extractions(s): Physical (decrypted bootloader) – Full file system

Date/Time added

Sent/Received?

Data description
“Hello”
“This is a test of the disappearing messages”
“I will save this message” – iPhone saved
“Hello”
“I will now save this message”
“iPhone save this message” – iPhone saved
“Samsung save this message” – Samsung
saved
Photo of BIC pen – Saved by iPhone
Timed (10s) photo of screwdriver

02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21
02/02/2022 13:21

Received
Received
Sent
Sent
Sent
Received
Sent

02/02/2022 13:23
02/02/2022 13:23

Received
Received

02/02/2022 13:25

Sent

Photo of evidence tape – Replayed & saved by
Samsung

02/02/2022 13:26

Sent

Timed (10s) photo of duct tape

02/02/2022 13:28
02/02/2022 13:28
02/02/2022 13:29
02/02/2022 13:90

Sent
Received
Received
Sent

Photo of screwdriver
Photo of screwdriver
“This message will not be saved”
“Neither will this”

Cellebrite
Recoverable?
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
/
(Blank message)
/
(Video file
missing)
/
(Video file
missing)
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 4: Snapchat extraction Samsung S6
Telegram Secret Chat Messages, Device: iPhone 6S
Tools used: UFED 4PC
Extraction(s): Logical & Advanced Logical

Date/Time
added
09/02/2022
10:26
09/02/2022
10:26

Sent/Received

Data Description

Sent - (nondisappearing)
Received (nondisappearing)
Sent

“Hello”

09/02/2022
10:28

Received

“We shall see how this does”

09/02/2022
10:29

Sent

“Have a photo” PHOTO 2
attached

09/02/2022
10:28

“Hello there”
“I have activated
disappearing messages”

Cellebrite PreDisappearing?
Y

Cellebrite PostDisappearing?
Y

Y

Y

/
(Required manual
hex viewing)
/
(Required manual
hex viewing)
/
(Required manual
hex viewing)

/
(Required manual
hex viewing)
/
(Required manual
hex viewing)
/
(Required manual
hex viewing)

09/02/2022
10:29

Received

PHOTO 1 sent

09/02/2022
10:30
09/02/2022
10:30
09/02/2022
10:30
09/02/2022
10:31

Sent

VIDEO 2 attached

Received

VIDEO 1 sent

Sent

“Can you delete messages?”

Received

“I will also delete this
message”

/
(Required manual
hex viewing)
N

/
(Required manual
hex viewing)
N

/
(Blank message)
N

/
(Blank message)
N

N

N

Table 5: Telegram extraction iPhone 6S

Telegram Extraction, Device: Samsung S6
Tools used: UFED 4PC
Extraction(s): Extraction: Physical (decrypted bootloader) – Full File System

Date/Time
added

Sent/Received

09/02/2022 10:26

09/02/2022 10:28

Sent - (nondisappearing)
Received - (nondisappearing)
Sent

09/02/2022 10:28
09/02/2022 10:29
09/02/2022 10:29
09/02/2022 10:30
09/02/2022 10:30
09/02/2022 10:30
09/02/2022 10:31

Received
Sent
Received
Sent
Received
Sent
Received

09/02/2022 10:26

Data Description

Cellebrite PreDisappearing?

“Hello”

N

Cellebrite
PostDisappearing?
N

“Hello there”

N

N

“I have activated
disappearing messages”
“We shall see how this does”
“Have a photo” PHOTO 2 attached
PHOTO 1 sent
VIDEO 2 attached
VIDEO 1 sent
“Can you delete messages?”
“I will also delete this message”

N

N

N
N
N
N
N
N
N

N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Table 6: Telegram extraction Samsung S6

5. Conclusion
Disappearing messages have a severe impact on digital forensics due to the time-sensitivity involved,
as well as investigative inexperience with this new and evolving technology. With criminals requiring
new ways to hide their crimes, and leaving no trail of evidence, they may indeed turn to disappearing
messages to achieve this. Although a users right to privacy is not openly investigated within these
experiments, the findings will help investigators determine the most appropriate way in which data
could be retrieved, reviewed and preserved. For example, informing and training both technical and
non-technical staff about disappearing messages and ensuring both sides are aware of the risks and
impact which they may have on the investigation is the first step to ensuring that disappearing messages
are dealt with correctly. In cases where disappearing messages are present on the device, a manual

review should be performed at the earliest priority, ensuring a photograph of the screen (showing the
expiring messages) is taken, which will allow for both evidence of the messages existing, as well as
potentially verifying any post-expiry messages within the data verification stage of the examination. In
cases where messages have not yet expired or have just expired, there is still potential for evidence to
be recovered using extractions where deleted data can be recovered (such as file system and physical
extractions).
However, both applications are somewhat competent for the thorough sanitation of data, which impacts
potential forensic investigations being able to retrieve and accurately verify data’s integrity, for
admission to court as evidence. Of our investigated apps, Snapchat is the most destructive for potential
evidence, whereas iOS devices would have to be subject to a manual review, and Android physicals
could retrieve all the necessary artefacts required for admissible evidence. With Telegram incomplete
data was the best extraction possible within our report, providing minimal artefact evidence.
Cloud extractions were not supported by Cellebrite Cloud Analyzer for either Snapchat or Telegram at
the time of writing. This testing group and its limited data have shown that Cloud extractions are not a
valid replacement for traditional mobile forensics as they currently stand and pose an unnecessary risk
in the potential loss of data and evidence by breaking the traditional forensic practice of network
isolation. Following this, the legal issues and complications in the retrieval of credentials provides
further evidence that this methodology is best reserved as a “last resort” in gaining evidential data.
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